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Synopsis Matching was developed in the 1960s to match such entities as residents and hospitals, colleges and students,
or employers and employees. This approach is based on ‘‘preference lists,’’ whereby each participant ranks potential
partners according to his/her preferences and tries to match with the highest-ranking partner available. Here, we discuss
the implications of matching for the study of mate choice and speciation. Matching differs from classic approaches in
several respects, most notably because under this theoretical framework, the formation of mating pairs is
context-dependant (i.e., it depends on the configuration of pairings in the entire population), because the stability of
mating pairs is considered explicitly, and because mate choice is mutual. The use of matching to study mate choice and
speciation is not merely a theoretical curiosity; its application can generate counter-intuitive predictions and lead to
conclusions that differ fundamentally from classic theories about sexual selection and speciation. For example, it predicts
that when mate choice is mutual and the stability of mating pairs is critical for successful reproduction, sympatric
speciation is a robust evolutionary outcome. Yet the application of matching to the study of mate choice and speciation
has been largely dominated by theoretical studies. We present the hamlets, a group of brightly colored Caribbean coral
reef fishes in the genus Hypoplectrus (Serranidae), as a particularly apt system to test empirically specific predictions
generated by the application of matching to mate choice and speciation.
Introduction
A practical problem arose when residency began to
be implemented as part of the curriculum for med-
ical students in the United States during the past
century. Students wanted to undertake their resi-
dency in the best possible hospital, and hospitals
wanted to attract the best students. Yet, there were
more available positions than students, which gener-
ated intense competition among hospitals for resi-
dents. This resulted in the advancement of the date
of the finalization of binding agreements between
students and hospitals, up to 2 years before the po-
sition would be actually taken up. How can students
and hospitals be matched in a way that is optimal for
students? For hospitals? This is a classic problem of
matching (see Roth 1984 for a review). Yet matching
can be applied to a variety of questions, as for ex-
ample, the matchings between students of colleges,
men and women, buyers, and sellers, and—our focus
of interest here—males and females in the context of
mate choice and sexual reproduction.
Matching is based on lists of preferences, whereby
each participant ranks all potential partners accord-
ing to his/her preferences and tries to match with the
highest-ranking partner available, i.e., achieve the
highest satisfaction. For example, in the case of res-
idents and hospitals, each resident has a specific
ranking of hospitals according to his/her preferences
and each hospital has a specific ranking of students
according to its needs and preferences. These rank-
ings, referred to as ‘‘preference lists,’’ constitute the
basic material upon which matching is built.
Matching is said to be two-sided when members of
two different groups are matched (e.g., residents and
hospital), and one-sided when members of a single
group are matched among themselves (e.g., room-
mates, the ‘‘roommate problem’’). In both cases,
matching constitutes a complex problem due to the
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large number of possible matches. For example, in
the roommate problem there are (2N)!/[2N(N!)] ways
to match 2N individuals in pairs in two-bedroom
apartments (Morrill 2010), which represents over
654 million possibilities for only 20 individuals.
An important achievement of matching has been
its ability to address such complex problems with
relatively simple algorithms. Gale and Shapley
(1962) showed notably that a stable set of matching
always exists in the ‘‘marriage problem,’’ in which
men and women are matched in couples. A stable
set of matching corresponds to a situation in which
no new pair can form that would improve the sat-
isfaction of both partners. Gale and Shapley (1962)
pointed out that such a situation is always produced
by the following algorithm: (1) each man proposes to
his favorite woman, (2) each woman who receives
more than one proposal rejects all but her most pre-
ferred man, who is accepted provisionally, (3) if a
man is rejected he proposes to his next choice, and
again each woman who receives more than one pro-
posal (including a provisionally accepted man, if ap-
plicable) rejects all but her most preferred man, who
is accepted provisionally. This procedure follows
until no man is rejected, at which point all women
accept their partner definitively. At the end of this
algorithm, called the ‘‘deferred-acceptance proce-
dure,’’ no new pair can form that would improve
the satisfaction of both partners; the set of pairings
is stable. This means that if a man was to propose to
a woman he prefers more than his wife, she would
not accept him because her husband ranks higher
than him in her preference list. Conversely, if a
woman was to propose to a man she prefers more
than her husband, he would not accept her because
his wife ranks higher than her in his preference list.
Of course, the symmetric algorithm where women
propose and men choose also leads to a stable set
of matching, although as discussed below not neces-
sarily the same one. Note that the deferred-
acceptance procedure does not necessarily imply an
equal number of men and women. In this case, a
stable set of pairings also exists, with some individ-
uals remaining single.
In addition to stability, an important concept in
matching is optimality. A stable set of matching is
said to be optimal if every participant is at least as
well off under it as under any other stable set of
matching. Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that the
version of the deferred-acceptance procedure where
men propose leads to a pairing configuration that is
optimal for the men (i.e., every man is at least as
well off under this set of matching as under any
other stable assignment) and, conversely, that the
version in which women propose leads to a pairing
configuration that is optimal for the women. These
two stable sets of pairings differ unless a single stable
assignment exists, in which case it is reached by both
versions of the algorithm.
The deferred-acceptance procedure is a good illus-
tration of this approach to matching, which has been
largely dominated by the question as to whether
stable sets of matching exist, if so which ones are
optimal, and how to reach these assignments.
These types of questions have been addressed from
two fields, computer science and economics game
theory, as illustrated by the two monographs The
Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms
by Gusfield and Irving (1989) and Two-sided
Matching: A Study in Game-theoretic Modeling and
Analysis by Roth and Sotomayor (1990), respectively.
Here, we discuss some implications of matching for
the study of mate choice and speciation, and empha-
size an approach that does not necessarily focus on
stable or optimal sets of matching (Almeida and
de Abreu 2003).
Implications for the study of mate
choice and speciation
The application of matching to the study of mate
choice presents several aspects that differ fundamen-
tally from classic approaches. Most importantly,
pairing is explicitly considered as a ‘‘context-
dependant’’ process: it depends not only on the
traits and preferences of two potential mates, but
also on the traits, preferences and pairing configura-
tion in the entire population. Two individuals may
or may not end up pairing depending on whether
preferred mates exist in the population, if so whether
they have a partner, and if so whether they would be
inclined to switch partners. When this is considered
explicitly for all sexually mature individuals in a pop-
ulation, pairing becomes precisely the complex prob-
lem addressed by matching. This is in sharp contrast
with classic approaches to mate choice and sexual
selection in which pairing is considered largely out
of its social context, typically by looking at the prob-
ability of mating between pairs of individuals with-
out explicit consideration to what other members of
the population are doing (Lande 1981).
In addition, matching considers explicitly the ‘‘sta-
bility’’ of mating pairs. The notion of stability de-
fined above was considered at the level of the entire
population, with a stable set of pairings correspond-
ing to a situation in which no new pair can form
that would improve the satisfaction of both partners.
Stability can also be considered at the level of










individual pairs. For example, a pair in which both
individuals rank first in the preference list of their
partner is stable (these two individuals cannot form a
new pair that would improve their satisfaction), even
if the set of pairings is not stable (other members of
the population can form new pairs that would im-
prove their satisfaction). From a biological perspec-
tive, the concept of stability of mating pairs applies
to all situations in which ‘‘spending time together’’ is
required for successful reproduction. Spending time
together could correspond to a variety of situations,
as for example the time required for courtship,
building a nest or raising offspring together. The
stability of the mating pair is critical in these situa-
tions because reproductive success will be affected if
one of the mates decides to switch partners during
this time. On the other hand, two mates who have
already invested a significant amount of energy in
the process of pairing (and/or mating, raising
young) may not be inclined to switch partners,
even if preferred partners are available in the popu-
lation. By considering explicitly the stability of pair-
ings, matching provides an opportunity to address
the consequences of pair stability for mate choice,
sexual selection and speciation.
Another important aspect of matching is that mate
choice is ‘‘mutual’’: selection of males by females and
of females by males. Mutual mate choice is known to
occur in a variety of taxa including fish, birds, am-
phibians, insects, and rotifers (Kraaijeveld et al.
2007). In addition, while mate choice is often
thought of as the familiar situation in which females
choose among males, the significance of males’ mate
choice for the maintenance of females’ ornamenta-
tion is receiving increasing attention and support,
even in polygynous species (Amundsen 2000;
Clutton-Brock 2007, 2009; Kraaijeveld et al. 2007).
Thus, mutual mate choice does not appear to be a
rarity in nature, and may even turn out to be more
common than generally assumed. Note that match-
ing does not necessarily imply that mutual mate
choice is perfectly symmetric. As discussed above, a
rather subtle level of asymmetry between the sexes
arises when one sex proposes and the other sex dis-
poses. Asymmetry in levels of choosiness between the
sexes could also be implemented within the frame-
work of matching, for example by applying a ran-
domization procedure to the preference lists of
individuals of one sex.
Additional implications of matching for the study
of mate choice have been emphasized by Bergstrom
and Real (2000). An important point is that since
each individual is characterized by a specific prefer-
ence list, matching provides an opportunity to
consider preferences that vary between individuals,
as opposed to preferences that are uniform within
a population. It is also to be noted that matching
is quite flexible with respect to mating systems. As
mentioned above, it does not necessarily require an
equal number of individuals of both sexes or sym-
metric, mutual mate-choice. In addition, it does not
necessarily imply the one-to-one matching between
the two sexes addressed by the marriage problem.
For example, in the case of residents and hospitals,
more than one resident can be matched to each hos-
pital. From a biological perspective, this situation of
many-to-one matching corresponds to pairing in po-
lygynous or polyandrous species, in which one male
(female) can be paired to several females (males).
The main concepts, used in matching and their im-
plications for mate choice are summarized in
Table 1.
Predictions
The application of matching to mate choice and spe-
ciation is not merely a theoretical curiosity; it can
generate counter-intuitive predictions and lead to
conclusions that differ fundamentally from classic
theories of sexual selection and speciation. For exam-
ple, in the marriage problem, the fact that the stable
set of matching reached by the deferred-acceptance
procedure is optimal for men when men propose
and optimal for women when women propose is
quite counter-intuitive; it implies that overall, what
is most beneficial is not the ability to choose among
individuals who propose, but the ability to chose the
individuals to whom one proposes (Bergstrom and
Real 2000).
To the best of our knowledge, a single (theoreti-
cal) study has used matching to study the role played
by sexual selection in the process of speciation
(Almeida and de Abreu 2003). In this model, pref-
erence lists are established with respect to a specific
phenotypic trait (e.g., size, larger individuals are pre-
ferred) and pairs are formed following an iterative
procedure similar to the deferred-acceptance proce-
dure. At each iteration, every male proposes to a
female ranking higher than his current mate in his
preference list (or to any female if he is single) and
females accept only males ranking higher than their
current partner in their preference list. Only stable
pairs do reproduce, with stable pairs defined as pairs
for which no switching of mate occurs over T iter-
ations of the pairing procedure. In this situation, in
which mate choice is mutual (with the same trait
used for mate choice in both sexes) and pair stability
is critical for reproductive success, sympatric










speciation by sexual selection alone is a robust evo-
lutionary outcome. This conclusion is in sharp con-
trast with the current view that speciation by sexual
selection alone is unlikely in the presence of gene
flow (Panhuis et al. 2001; Turelli et al. 2001;
Bolnick and Fitzpatrick 2007; Ritchie 2007).
An interesting aspect of the study by Almeida and
de Abreu (2003) is that contrary to the traditional
matching approach, the authors did not focus on
stable sets of matching. Unlike the deferred-
acceptance procedure, the mating procedure imple-
mented in their model does not necessarily lead to a
stable set of pairings. Nevertheless, some mating
pairs are more stable than others and if these more
stable pairs are given a reproductive advantage, sym-
patric speciation follows. Thus, it is precisely the
nonequilibrium pairing dynamics that contribute to
speciation in their model. Considering the large
number of pairing possibilities for a relatively small
number of individuals (see numerical example
above), it would actually be surprising to observe
stable sets of matching in nature.
The model by Almeida and de Abreu (2003) pre-
dicts that when mate choice is mutual (with the
same phenotypic trait used for mate choice in both
sexes) and the stability of mating pairs is critical for
successful reproduction, speciation in the presence of
gene flow is a robust outcome. How common is this
situation in nature? The authors suggested that it
could apply to a ‘‘wide variety of taxa’’ including
yeasts, east-African cichlid fish (Seehausen et al.
1999), mammals, and plants. Identifying such taxa
from the literature is not a trivial task because it
implies a detailed knowledge of the reproductive bi-
ology of each group, and such a review is beyond
the scope of this perspective. Instead we present the
hamlets, a group Caribbean coral reef fishes in the
genus Hypoplectrus (Serranidae), as one system par-
ticularly apt for applying the perspective of matching
to the role played by sexual selection in the process
of speciation.
A system to address the role of
matching in mate choice and
speciation empirically
The hamlets are characterized by a remarkable poly-
morphism in color pattern, with at least 12 different
color morphs identified in the wider Caribbean
(Fig. 1). Most color morphs have been named as
species, and up to eight different color morphs can
be found on a single reef (Puebla et al. 2007). Pairing
and mating occurs on a daily basis before sunset.
Hamlets are simultaneous hermaphrodites and mate
Table 1 Main concepts of the matching approach and implications for mate choice
Concept Implications for mate choice
Preference lists The fact that each individual has a specific list in which all potential partners are ranked according to his/her
preferences implies that preferences are hierarchical, and may vary between individuals
Reciprocal preferences The fact that all individuals have a preference list also implies that mate choice is mutual (choice of males
by females and of females by males). Note that this does not necessarily imply symmetric mate choice,
one sex may be choosier that the other (see main text)
Context-dependant matching Mate choice is a fundamentally context-dependant process within the framework of matching. It depends not
only on the traits and preferences of two individuals, but also on the traits, preferences, and configuration
of pairings in the entire population. Two individuals may or may not form a mating pair depending on the
social context
Stability of matches The stability of mating pairs is considered explicitly, with a stable set of pairings defined as a situation in which
no new pair can form that would improve the satisfaction of both partners in terms of pairing with a
preferred mate. Note that the notion of stability may also be considered at the level of individual pairs
(see main text). From a biological perspective, the concept of stability of mating pairs applies to all
situations in which ‘‘spending time together’’ (e.g., for courtship or raising young) is required for
successful reproduction
Two-sided matching Two-sided matching refers to a situation in which members of two different groups (e.g., men and women)
are matched. From a biological perspective, this corresponds to pairing in species with separate sexes
One-sided matching One-sided matching refers to a situation in which members of a single group (e.g., room-mates) are matched
among themselves. From a biological perspective, this corresponds to pairing in simultaneous
hermaphrodites
One-to-one matching One-to-one matching implies that each individual is matched to at most one individual. From a biological
perspective, this corresponds to pairing in monogamous species
Many-to-one matching Many-to-one matching implies that each individual can be matched to more than one individual. From a
biological perspective, this corresponds to pairing in polygynous or polyandrous species










choice is mutual; individuals engage in an elaborate
courtship and they spawn in pairs, alternating sex
roles up to seven times during a single spawning
session (Fischer 1980a). There is no parental care,
fertilization is external and both eggs and larvae are
planktonic.
From an empirical perspective, an interesting
aspect of the hamlets is that pairing and spawning
can be observed in the field, which provides an op-
portunity to document the entire pairing process,
from courtship to spawning. Hamlets are predators
and they can be captured relatively easily with
hook-and-line using SCUBA. Once captured, indi-
viduals can be measured, fin-clipped for DNA anal-
ysis, tagged with Visible Implant Elastomer
(Northwest Marine TechnologyTM) and photo-
graphed, all underwater (Fig. 2). By tagging and re-
leasing all individuals of a given color morph on a
given reef, pairing interactions can be described at
the level of the entire population. In particular, the
decisions of tagged individuals when confronted to a
choice between two or more partners can be docu-
mented. By repeating these observations for all indi-
viduals with respect to as many other individuals as
possible, it should be possible to establish whether
the hamlets have the equivalent of a preference list. If
so, removing or adding specific individuals on the
reef would provide an opportunity to test specific
predictions about the rearrangement of pairings in
the population.
Fig. 1 Nine color morphs of hamlets. From upper left to lower right: barred hamlet (Hypoplectrus puella), black hamlet (H. nigricans),
butter hamlet (H. unicolor), shy hamlet (H. guttavarius), golden hamlet (H. gummigutta), yellowtail hamlet (H. chlorurus), indigo hamlet
(H. indigo), blue hamlet (H. gemma), and tan hamlet (Hypoplectrus sp.). Photographs with permission from Reef Fish Identification,
New World Publications,  2002, Paul Humann.
Fig. 2 Hamlets are predators and they can be captured relatively
easily with hook-and-line using SCUBA and tagged underwater
with Visible Implant Elastomer (Northwest Marine
TechnologyTM). By tagging and releasing all individuals of a given
color morph on a given reef, the pairing dynamics can be doc-
umented at the level of the entire population.










Pairing is one-sided in the hamlets since they are
simultaneous hermaphrodites, i.e., an individual can
mate with any other sexually mature individual.
From the perspective of matching, this situation cor-
responds to the ‘‘roommate problem’’ briefly men-
tioned above, where pairs of individuals are matched
in two-bedroom apartments. Gale and Shapley
(1962) noted that contrary to the case of the mar-
riage problem, there is not necessarily a stable set of
matching in the roommate problem. This can be
shown with a simple example, as illustrated in
Fig. 3. Thus, the set of pairings in hamlet popula-
tions is not necessarily expected to be stable. Since
hamlets spawn on a daily basis, the stability of
mating pairs can be documented by repeating
spawning observations every evening, providing an
opportunity to establish whether a stable set of pair-
ings has been reached in the population.
Hamlets spawn largely between members of the
same color morph (Fischer 1980b; Domeier 1994;
Barreto and McCartney 2007; Puebla et al. 2007),
and the paragraph above illustrated how mate
choice within color morphs can be addressed from
the perspective of matching. Yet pairings and spawn-
ings between different color morphs do occasionally
occur in the field (Fischer 1980b; Barreto and
McCartney 2007; Puebla et al. 2007), suggesting
that there is ongoing gene flow between color
morphs. This hypothesis is further supported by
the lack of intrinsic barriers to fertilization between
color morphs (Whiteman and Gage 2007), the oc-
currence of individuals with intermediate color
patterns in the field (Puebla et al. 2008), and the
low levels of genetic differentiation between sympat-
ric color morphs (Graves and Rosenblatt 1980;
McCartney et al. 2003, Puebla et al. 2007). Thus,
the hamlets also provide an opportunity to address
the role played by mate choice in the process of
speciation in the presence gene flow (i.e., sympatric
speciation). In particular, hybridization can be stud-
ied within its social context in the field using the
perspective of matching. For example, if individuals
rank members of different color morphs lower than
members of their own color morph in their prefer-
ence lists, it is predicted that hybridization will occur
only when mates of the same color morph are not
available in the population.
As mentioned above, Almeida and de Abreu
(2003) predicted that when mate choice is mutual
and the stability of mating pairs is critical for repro-
ductive success, the evolution of assortative mating
in the presence of gene flow by sexual selection alone
is a robust evolutionary outcome. Could the pairing
dynamics of the hamlets explain speciation in this
group? This question can be addressed empirically
by testing whether some mating pairs are more
stable than others and if so, whether individuals in-
volved in stable pairs have a higher reproductive suc-
cess than do individuals involved in unstable pairs.
Conclusion
In conclusion, matching provides a largely over-
looked theoretical framework for the study of mate
Fig. 3 Illustration of a situation in which no stable set of pairings exists. In this example, individual A prefers B then C then D, individual
B prefers C then A then D, individual C prefers A then B then D, and individual D prefers A then B then C. The reader can confirm
that there is no stable set of pairings in this situation, and that the pairing configuration will cycle indefinitely following the black arrows.










choice and speciation. This approach presents several
aspects that differ from classic theories of sexual se-
lection and speciation, notably the context-
dependent approach to the process of pairing, the
explicit consideration of the stability of mating
pairs, and mutual mate choice. Since natural popu-
lations are not necessarily expected to present stable
sets of matching, the consequences of non-
equilibrium pairing dynamics for mate choice and
speciation are of particular interest. Additional the-
oretical work integrating realistic settings based on
empirical systems such as the hamlets are needed
to validate the relevance of matching for the study
of mate choice and speciation.
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